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Abstract 
Background: Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) infection outbreaks are difficult to control and 
sometimes require cohorting of CRAB‑positive patients or temporary ward closure for environmental cleaning. We 
aimed at controlling the deadly 2018 CRAB outbreak in a 12 bed‑ intensive care unit (ICU) including 9 beds in a 220 
 m2 open space. We implemented a new multimodal approach without ward closure, cohorting or temporarily limit‑
ing admissions.
Methods: A five‑component bundle was introduced in 2018 including reinforcement of hand hygiene and sample 
extension of screening, application of contact precautions to all patients, enhanced environmental sampling and the 
one‑time application of a cycling radical environmental cleaning and disinfection procedure of the entire ICU.
The ICU‑CRAB incidence density (ID), ICU alcohol‑based hand rub consumption and antibiotic use were calculated 
over a period of 6 years and intervention time series analysis was performed. Whole genome sequencing analysis 
(WGS) was done on clinical and environmental isolates in the study period.
Results: From January 2013, nosocomial ICU‑CRAB ID decreased from 30.4 CRAB cases per 1000 patients‑days to zero 
cases per 1000 patients‑days. Our intervention showed a significant impact (‑2.9 nosocomial ICU‑CRAB cases per 1000 
bed‑days), while no influence was observed for antibiotic and alcohol‑based hand rub (AHR) consumption.
WGS demonstrated that CRAB strains were clonally related to an environmental reservoir which confirms the primary 
role of the environment in CRAB ICU spreading.
Conclusion: A five‑component bundle of continuous hand hygiene improvement, extended sampling at screen‑
ing including the environment, universal contact precautions and a novel cycling radical environmental cleaning and 
disinfection procedure proved to be effective for permanently eliminating CRAB spreading within the ICU. Cohorting, 
admission restriction or ICU closure were avoided.
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Background
Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (CRAB) 
infections have increased over the last ten years in inten-
sive care units (ICUs), in particular in Italy and Greece 
[1–3]. CRAB is difficult to eradicate from the environ-
ment due to its ability to persist on surfaces and reduced 
susceptibility to biocides [4, 5].
In this scenario, because of the propensity of CRAB to 
cause outbreaks in the healthcare setting, effective and 
targeted infection prevention and control (IPC) interven-
tions are essential to stop CRAB spreading [6].
Multimodal IPC strategies appear to be highly effective 
for CRAB prevention and control [6, 7]. Several national 
and international guidelines provide evidence-based 
recommendations to prevent and control CRAB cross-
transmission in hospital settings [8–11]. Nevertheless, 
controversy exists about which strategy is most prag-
matic, especially in the context of limited economic and 
logistic resources and with regard to local epidemiology 
[7]. Lack of evidence is due to study designs because, in 
order to assess complex IPC interventions, it is often not 
possible to conduct a randomized controlled trial. Indeed, 
most intervention studies conducted in the Americas or 
Europe describing hospital or intensive care unit (ICU)-
specific interventions were uncontrolled. The most com-
mon outcome was incidence of infection [12–16]. For 
CRAB, the main intervention components included alert 
codes, education, and environmental cleaning in addition 
to what are now established as hand hygiene and contact 
precautions. Successful control of CRAB outbreaks often 
required transfer of positive patients to a cohort ward 
[12–19] and sometimes temporary closure of the ICU 
[16, 20–22] Additional file  1 shows an overview of IPC 
components in published studies and of the present bun-
dle ( Supplementary Material). Unfortunately, the latter 
practices are very difficult to implement in hospitals with 
only one open space ICU and limited staff and resources.
We report on the rapid and successful control of CRAB 
spreading in an endemic ICU, by applying an ICP bundle 




The Azienda Ospedaliero Universitaria (AOU) Policlin-
ico in Modena, Italy is a 700-bed tertiary care university 
teaching hospital. The ICU has 12 beds: three in single 
patient, closed, isolation rooms and nine in a 220  m2 
open space (Fig. 1A), with a constant bed occupancy rate 
of 95%. The staffing proportion is one nurse for two beds.
The hospital infection control team consists of two 
physicians, three infection control nurses, a microbiolo-
gist, two nurses and two physicians from the ICU staff.
Routine IPC practices and antimicrobial stewardship
Since 2011, hospital-wide rectal screening for all carbap-
enem-resistant Gram-negative bacteria (CR- GNB) is 
performed at admission and repeated weekly. An active 
surveillance system involving the microbiology labora-
tory and infection control staff allows to promptly iden-
tify all patients colonized or infected with CR-GNB. 
CR-GNB-colonized patients are cared for with contact 
precautions, using gowns and gloves for any patient 
contact. As from 2012, a multimodal project of hand 
hygiene according to WHO recommendations[23] was 
implemented. An antimicrobial stewardship program, in 
addition to standard consultations, has started since Sep-
tember 2014, with audit and immediate feedback three 
times per week performed by an infectious disease spe-
cialist, and a restricted formulary for carbapenems, fluo-
roquinolones, colistin, and tigecycline.
Routine twice daily standard cleaning of the single 
patient units (i.e. isolation rooms and open space areas) 
with 10% sodium hypochlorite for environmental sur-
faces and hydrogen peroxide in wipes for all medical 
devices.
CRAB was endemic in the ICU and the hospital. 
Between February and March 2018, 5 CRAB-infected 
patients died in the ICU (Table 1), and this was the rea-
son for intensifying ICP measures. This period is termed 
“CRAB outbreak”.
Intervention
The intervention in the ICU was a five-component bun-
dle implemented over time during the outbreak.
• A long-term component of the bundle started from 
28th February 2018 and was continued thereafter:
1. Proactive reinforcement of all routine IPC practices 
among healthcare workers:
a. improving hand hygiene compliance with 100 
direct observations of the “5 moments” opportu-
Keywords: Carbapenem‑resistant Acinetobacter baumannii, Intensive care unit, Cycling radical environmental 
cleaning, Infection control bundle, Whole genome sequencing analysis
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nities performed by IPC nurses according to the 
WHO [23] guidelines followed by individualized 
verbal feedback
b. creating an “improvement group” with medical 
and nursing staff to analyse critical issues regard-
ing hand hygiene compliance
Fig. 1 The cycling disinfection procedure. The cycling disinfection procedure consisted of terminal cleaning and disinfection of each unit with 
10% sodium hypochlorite for environmental surfaces and hydrogen peroxide in wipes for all medical devices, from upper corner to opposite lower 
corner starting from a transitory unit to be kept free. The common areas in the ICU were cleaned and disinfected, then the colonized patient was 
moved from his original unit to the transitory unit in order to have the patient’s original unit disinfected. In the transitory unit, the patient’s skin 
was disinfected with 2% leave‑on chlorhexidine disposable cloths and he was transferred to his cleaned bed. Then the patient was relocated to the 
cleaned and disinfected original unit and the transitory unit was subsequently cleaned and disinfected. The whole process takes on average 6 h to 
be completed needing the recruitment of an additional nurse crew and dedicated cleaning staff
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c. monitoring compliance with contact precau-
tions performed by IPC nurses using two specific 
checklists
d. meetings with radiology and transport personnel 
to reinforce compliance with IPC measures
2. Extended screening. All patients with an expected 
length of stay on the ICU for > 24  h were screened 
for the carriage of CRAB. This was done by collecting 
the following samples at admission and weekly there-
after: swabs from the axilla, the groin, the trachea 
in addition to the rectum. Screening samples were 
performed using selective MacConkey agar plates 
(bioMérieux Firenze, Italia) with meropenem (10 µg) 
disks.
3. Contact precaution measures for all patients until 
discharge, independently of CRAB status (Personal 
protective equipment for each single patient unit 
included wearing single-use gloves and gowns before 
entering, changing the gloves according to WHO 5 
moments for hand hygiene).
4. Environmental sampling using pre-moistened sterile 
gauze pads; the procedure previously recommended 
by Corbella et  al. [24] was introduced in order to 
increase sensitivity. All ICU surfaces were vigorously 
rubbed by means of moistened sterile gauze pads in a 
screw-cap container with 10 mL of brain heart infu-
sion medium (BHI). After 24 h of incubation at 37 °C 
in BHI, gauzes were sampled into MacConkey agar 
plates and incubated aerobically at 37 °C for 48 h.
• A short-term component of the bundle that was 
applied only once:
5. Cycling radical cleaning and disinfection of all rooms, 
areas and patients, (Fig. 1B), detailed below.
 In summary, among the above-mentioned intervention 
strategies, components 4 and 5 were de novo introduced, 
components 2 and 3 were intensified and revised (e. g. 
universal versus target contact precautions; multiple sites 
active screening versus rectal screening only), component 
1 was reinforced as it was applied intermittently in the 
previous years.
To further investigate the outbreak, whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) analysis was performed on sixteen 
CRAB isolates, including all seven environmental and a 
selection of nine clinical isolates. Clinical isolates for gen-
otyping were selected giving priority to diagnostic sam-
ples from sterile body sites, surveillance samples were 
included only in the absence of clinical ones in order to 
collect at least one sample per patient. Microbiologi-
cal analysis and whole genome analysis sequencing are 
detailed in Additional file 2.
Cycling radical cleaning procedure
A novel radical cleaning procedure was performed on 
April 12nd (Fig. 1B). This method was applied only once 
and consisted of terminal cleaning and disinfection of 
each unit with 10% sodium hypochlorite for environmen-
tal surfaces and hydrogen peroxide in wipes for all medi-
cal devices, from upper corner to opposite lower corner 
starting from a transitory unit to be kept free.
The disinfectants were allowed to dry completely before 
re-using the surface. The common areas in the ICU were 
disinfected, then the colonized patient was moved from 
his original unit to the transitory unit in order to have the 
patient’s original unit disinfected. In the transitory unit, 
the patient’s skin was disinfected with 2% leave-on chlo-
rhexidine disposable cloths and he was transferred to his 
cleaned bed. Then the patient was relocated to the dis-
infected original unit and the transitory unit was subse-
quently disinfected. The whole process takes in average 
6 h to be completed needing the recruitment of an addi-
tional nurse shift and dedicated cleaning staff of 2 people.
Cleaned surfaces were checked by infection control 
nurses using fluorescein spray with an UV torch. Fluo-
rescent spots indicated that the surface had not been 
cleaned effectively, and disinfection was repeated. Thanks 
to this simple procedure, it was possible to easily check 
if the surfaces were truly cleaned, especially in hard-to-
reach areas. It also helped to establish whether there 
was a need for staff re-training or a change in cleaning 
practices.
Data collection and definitions
For each CRAB infected or colonized patient, demo-
graphic and clinical characteristics were collected from 
the electronic medical records.
Hospital acquired infection (HAI) was defined accord-
ing to the criteria used by the Centres for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention [25]. Colonization with CRAB was 
defined as the detection of this pathogen in swabs with-
out any evidence of clinical disease. Episodes of colo-
nization or infection were considered ICU-acquired if 
they were not present at the time of admission and were 
acquired after 48  h from ICU admission (nosocomial 
ICU-CRAB). Conversely, CRAB events were defined as 
imported to ICU if they were detected on ICU-admis-
sion by screening or appeared within 48  h from hos-
pital admission (imported-ICU-CRAB). The monthly 
Incidence Density (ID) of nosocomial ICU-CRAB and 
imported ICU-CRAB was also calculated by dividing 
the number of cases (including both colonization and 
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infections) by the total number of days of ICU stay of all 
patients at risk and expressed per 1000 patient-days from 
January 2013 to December 2019.
Compliance with hand hygiene was assessed through 
ICU monthly consumption of alcohol-based hand rubs 
(AHR) expressed as litres per 1000 bed-days. Carbap-
enem and fluoroquinolone consumption was calcu-
lated using ICU monthly consumption data, expressed 
as the number of Defined Daily Doses (DDDs) per 1000 
bed-days.
Statistical analysis
To detect a possible change in the  CRAB ID trends in 
ICU after the two kinds of interventions (long-term and 
short-term as defined in the Intervention section), an 
Intervention Time Series Analysis was conducted using 
monthly data (a total of 82 observations) [26–29]. First, 
a graphic exploration of the series was performed. Line 
plots at monthly time series were produced for nosoco-
mial ICU-CRAB ID, for imported ICU-CRAB ID, for the 
use of each antimicrobial drug class and for AHR use to 
examine their evolution over time and to compare their 
respective impact.
Once the basic characteristics (i.e., autocorrelation, 
seasonality, and general and post-intervention trends) 
of each of the above-mentioned time series were estab-
lished, a multivariate analysis was performed to quan-
tify the relationships between use of the mentioned 
antimicrobial classes, AHR use, imported ICU-CRAB 
ID and Intervention over nosocomial ICU-CRAB ID by 
using dynamic time-series modelling techniques. For 
this purpose, a Linear Transfer Function (LTF) model 
was built according to the identification method pro-
posed by Pankratz [26] and Lon-Mo Liu [27]. In the LTF 
model we included a binary term (coded as 0 before the 
long-term intervention and 1 afterward), as well as an 
additional binary term for the short-term intervention 
(coded as 1 for April 2018 only and as 0 thereafter), to 
estimate the impact of the intervention controlling for 
the rest of mentioned variables. We followed a backward 
modelling strategy, initially considering all series as pos-
sible explaining series, including ICU-CRAB ID (except 
trends related) lagged from 1 to 4 periods and eliminating 
the lags that did not show a significant relationship (p ≤ 
0.05). Data were analysed with SCA release 8.1 [Scientific 
Computer Associates, Chicago (IL), www. scausa. com].
Results
Outbreak description
The index patient (P1) came from Greece and was admit-
ted to the ICU on February 25th while waiting for a liver 
retransplant after receiving a first transplant in Athens in 
January 2018. CRAB was isolated from the surveillance 
rectal swab taken on admission and on February 27th 
she developed a CRAB bloodstream infection (BSI). 
From the end of February to mid-March 2018, six other 
ICU patients were found positive for CRAB: four were 
infected (P2, P5, P6 and P7) and two colonized (P3 and 
P4). All patient surveillance samples collected at ICU 
admission were negative for CRAB. Characteristics of the 
patients and CRAB isolates collected during the outbreak 
are shown in Table 1.
Patient history, clinical course and characteristics are 
fully described in Additional file  2 and in Additional 
file 1:  Table 1, within the same Additional file 2. Antimi-
crobial susceptibility testing of the CRAB clinical isolates 
is shown in 1: Table 3 (Additional file 2).
Environmental sampling during the outbreak
To compare the sensitivity of environmental sample col-
lection methods, two procedures were performed in par-
allel: standard technique through cotton applicator swabs 
and the newly introduced BHI moistened sterile gauze 
technique.
After the death of P2, three out of 10 environmen-
tal samples collected with sterile BHI moistened gauze, 
all bordering on the P1 and P2 area, were positive for 
CRAB, including: bedside table handle in the P1 area 
(isolate code Ab274), linen counter handle in front of the 
P2 area (Ab280) and emergency joint cart located in the 
open space (Ab281). Conversely, no bacterial growth was 
observed using standard cotton swabs of the same sur-
faces. We can assume that emergency joint cart (Ab281) 
promoted the CRAB cross-transmission between P2 and 
the other three patients (P3, P4, P5).
After the death of P1, standard terminal cleaning of 
her isolation room using 10% sodium hypochlorite was 
performed and 10 environmental samples were col-
lected according to the CDC Environmental Checklist for 
Monitoring Terminal Cleaning, paying particular atten-
tion to high-touch surfaces. Despite the cleaning, four 
out of ten environmental samples collected by the mois-
tened gauze method of P1’s room yielded CRAB, includ-
ing multi-monitor controls (Ab272), P1 IV pole (grab 
area) (Ab283), medical equipment cart/medication cart 
(Ab279), P1 bed (Ab285). As before, environmental cul-
tures obtained using standard technique yielded negative 
results. Comparing the two procedures, both performed 
in all sampling, BHI moistened sterile gauze technique 
was a more sensitive method for CRAB detection (40% 
positives vs 0%; P < 0.05), and subsequently replaced the 
standard technique. After applying cycling radical clean-
ing and disinfection and using fluorescein spray for moni-
toring the effectiveness of terminal cleaning, no sample 
obtained with the moistened gauze technique was posi-
tive for CRAB in the whole ICU.
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Outbreak profiling by WGS analysis
In silico determination of MLST according to the Pasteur 
scheme revealed that all 16 isolates belonged to sequence 
type (ST) 2, that is part of the international clone II line-
age. Conversely, determination of MLST according to the 
Oxford scheme revealed the presence of three distinct 
clones, of which ST451 was the most prevalent (n = 13) 
over ST208 (n = 2) and the singleton ST195 (Fig. 2A).
Evaluation of core genome single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) corroborated the presence of mul-
tiple CRAB clones during the outbreak. Indeed, the 
genetic diversity observed between ST451 and ST208 
(SNPs range: 1148–1151; mean\median: 1149) or ST195 
(SNPs range: 1050–1053; mean\median: 1051), as well 
as between ST208 and ST195 (809 SNPs), was signifi-
cantly higher than that observed within each clone. In 
fact, only few SNPs were identified within ST451 isolates 
(SNPs range: 0–7; mean\median: 2) while no SNPs were 
detected within the two ST208 isolates.
Screening for acquired resistance determinants 
revealed that, except for the single ST195 isolate not 
producing TEM-1D, all isolates carried genes coding for 
TEM-1D and OXA-23 or OXA-225 (OXA-23-like) -type 
carbapenemases; additionally, a clone-specific content of 
genes coding for aminoglycoside resistance was observed 
(Fig. 2A).
Screening for virulence traits revealed the presence of 
an insertional inactivation of the adeN gene, coding for a 
negative regulator of the AdeIJK efflux system. The inac-
tivation of adeN was detected in all sequenced isolates 
except ST195, belonged to respiratory sample collected 
from P1 (Ab284).
Inference of the most likely transmission events
Based on WGS and patient data, the following epi-
demiological scenario was hypothesized. P1, arriving 
from Greece, was apparently colonised by two differ-
ent CRAB clones of ST195 (Ab284) and ST451 (Ab278), 
respectively, of which the latter caused the bloodstream 
infection (BSI) episode observed at admission. ST451 
subsequently spread in the ward, with contamina-
tion of environmental surfaces and cross-transmission 
Fig. 2 Outbreak profiling with WGS analysis and inference of the most likely transmission events. WGS: whole genome sequencing; CRAB: 
carbapenem‑resistant A. baumannii; ICU: intensive care unit. Patients’ samples refer to: P1: blood (25/2, 27/2, 13/3,20/3, 22/3, 3/4, 10/4), 
bronchial aspirate (26/2,4/3,10/4), bile (25/2), peritoneal fluid (25/2, 10/4), urine (26/2), rectal swab (26/2,4/3,13/3,17/3,22/3,4/4), skin 
(26/2,4/3,13/3,17/3,22/3,4/4); P2: blood (28/2), urine (28/2), skin (28/2), rectal swab (28/2); P3: skin (8/3); P4: urine (14/3,18/3), central venous catheter 
insertion tip (14/3), skin (14/3), rectal swab (14/3); P5: bronchial aspirate (15/3, 21/3), rectal swab (16/3, 20/3), skin (16/3, 20/3); P6: blood (22/3), 
bronchial aspirate (22/3), decubitus ulcers (22/3), skin (22/3), rectal swab (22/3); P7: blood (28/3), bronchial aspirate (27/3), skin (27/3), rectal swab 
(27/3). Environmental samples refer to: Ab274: bedside table handle in the P1 area; Ab280: linen counter handle in front of the P2 area; Ab281: 
emergency joint cart located in open bay space; Ab272: multi‑monitor controls; Ab279: medical equipment cart/ medication cart; Ab283: P1 IV pole 
(grab area); Ab285: P1 bed
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to other patients (P2, P3, P4 and P5) who experienced 
either colonization or infection. Indeed, isolation of an 
ST451 CRAB (Ab281) highly related to Ab278 from the 
emergency joint cart three days after identification of 
the index case, strongly suggests that there was an early 
contamination of the ICU environment with this strain, 
which apparently persisted until mid-April, as demon-
strated by the positivity for closely related ST451 CRAB 
(Ab272, Ab283, Ab279, Ab285) of environmental sam-
ples collected at that time (Fig. 2B). On the other hand, 
despite concomitant ICU stay, P6 and P7 were infected 
with a different clone belonging to ST208, showing a 
different resistome profile compared to that of ST451, 
which was apparently derived from an additional CRAB 
introduction within the ICU setting (Fig. 2B).
ICU‑CRAB epidemiology: results from the intervention 
time series analysis
Figure  3A shows the monthly CRAB ID trend distin-
guishing between nosocomial ICU and imported ICU 
isolates. From January 2013, nosocomial ICU-CRAB 
ID varied considerably, peaking at 30.4 and 25 CRAB 
cases per 1,000 patients-days in January 2016 and Janu-
ary 2018, respectively. Following the intervention, noso-
comial ICU-CRAB ID achieved zero cases per 1000 
patients-days: no new nosocomial ICU-CRAB case was 
identified from April 2018 onwards, after the cycling 
cleaning procedure was performed, apart from sporadic 
imported CRAB cases in patients admitted from commu-
nity or from other hospitals.
From 2013 to 2019, ICU AHR use increased progres-
sively from 30 to 100 L per 1000 patient-days. Total 
Antibiotic use decreased from 209 to 171 DDD/1000 
patients-days (data not shown), while carbapenems and 
fluoroquinolone use decreased from 60 to 10 and from 50 
to 8 DDD/1000 patients-days, respectively (Fig. 3B).
After identifying an Intervention Time Series Analy-
sis model with all significant parameters, the short-term 
Intervention showed a significant impact (-7.2 ICU cases 
per 1000 bed-days) while the impact of the long-term 
intervention was also significant: -2.22 cases per 1000 
bed-days (Table  2). The series imported ICU-CRAB ID 
showed a positive impact on nosocomial ICU-CRAB ID 
lagged by one month (each new case of imported ICU 
CRAB will select 0.67 new ICU CRAB cases). There was 
also a significant influence of past abrupt changes (t-2 
and t-5  months) and the previous month of the same 
ICU-CRAB ID. Conversely, we did not observe a statisti-
cally significant effect of antibiotic and AHR use on ICU-
CRAB ID, probably because the AHR use had already 
increased (2015/2016) and antimicrobial use had already 
decreased (2016/2017) prior to the intervention (Fig. 3B).
Discussion
To finally control nosocomial CRAB in our ICU, we suc-
cessfully applied a “five-component bundle”, which con-
sisted of reinforcement of previously recommended 
measures [7, 10, 11, 17] and innovative actions. The 
novel procedure Cycling radical cleaning and disinfection 
allowed us to avoid ICU closure and limiting admissions. 
Moreover, contrary to previously reported experiences 
[20–22], we did not need cohorting of patients. This 
intervention, although being labor-intensive, was appli-
cable in our open space ICU, a type of ICU which is the 
most affected by nosocomial epidemics [28]. Our expe-
rience can help hospitals with single ICUs facing similar 
outbreaks and endemicity.
Since in many hospitals it is unthinkable to close the 
hospital’s only ICU, this procedure should be considered 
in such settings as it can be completed on average in 6 h 
with an additional crew of trained staff. It also avoids 
restricting ICU admissions. Furthermore, patient cohort-
ing is hard to implement in an open space ICU and has 
a high probability of failure because of low compliance 
and difficulties in full cohorting of all medical staff, clean-
ing staff and consultants. Nurse cohorting, which often 
requires an additional nurse shift, is even more difficult.
To date, no published interventions avoided at least 
temporary closure or cohorting of colonized patients to 
limit CRAB spread in an ICU (Additional file 1). Moreo-
ver, considering that ward closures and temporary limit-
ing admissions contributed to the largest part of the total 
costs for outbreak control [29], these findings could be 
valuable.
The efficacy of a multimodal approach on CRAB out-
break control has been widely underlined in several 
guidelines and single center experiences [8–20]. How-
ever, our intervention study added a new element in 
the control of this hard-to-treat pathogen and clari-
fied the transmission dynamics of CRAB, an issue still 
under investigation [30]. Environmental contamination 
appeared to represent the most frequent source of CRAB 
cross-transmission in ICU.
By using intervention time-series analysis, we demon-
strated that an ICP bundle including enhanced environ-
mental cleaning had a decisive impact on nosocomial 
CRAB ICU incidence density against a background of 
stable AHR and antibiotic use. The short-term Interven-
tion was three times more effective than the long-term 
one, because it eliminated the chronic load of environ-
mental bacterial contamination.
Valencia-Martìn et  al. underlined that the major limi-
tation of the design of a multimodal program is that it 
usually precludes the understanding of which is the most 
effective strategy to eradicate CRAB from ICUs, given 
that all strategies are applied simultaneously [16]. Indeed, 
































































































































































































































































































































































Carbapenems DDD/1000 paents-days Fluoroquinolones DDD/1000 paents-days
AHR liters/1000 paents-days Long Intervenon
Short Intervenon
Fig. 3 Graphic representation of monthly Incidence Density of new nosocomial and imported cases of ICU CRAB (A); antibiotic and AHR 
consumptions (B), January 2013‑ January 2019. Thick grey line: long intervention. Black line: short intervention. A Blue line: nosocomial ICU‑CRAB 
ID. A Orange line: imported‑ICU‑CRAB ID. B Blue line: Carbapenems DDD/1000 patients‑days. B Orange line: Fluoroquinolones DDD/1000 
patients‑days. B Thin grey line: alcohol‑based hand rub (AHR) consumption in litres /1000 patients‑days. The multimodal intervention started on 
February 28th, 2018
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we cannot determine the effect of each individual com-
ponent of the bundle. Another relevant observation is 
that the colonization pressure, represented in the time 
series by the Non-ICU CRAB ID, works as an amplifier 
of nosocomial cases. This underlines that screening strat-
egies and immediate implementation of contact isola-
tion of CRAB carriers are key elements to prevent CRAB 
nosocomial transmission and subsequent infections.
Additionally, in line with previous evidence [5], we 
demonstrated that standard cleaning with self-monitor-
ing is insufficient to control the CRAB environmental 
spread. There are several promising emerging tech-
nologies for environmental cleaning and disinfection, 
but they are expensive, poorly tolerable and require a 
substantial amount of time before room release for any 
new patient [14, 20]. As an example, the “No-touch” 
cleaning methods, such as UV and pressurized hydro-
gen peroxide, are undoubtedly promising but require 
the room to be tightly closed and unoccupied. Due to 
these limitations, we used 10% sodium hypochlorite 
and hydrogen peroxide whilst focusing on increasing 
compliance through the routine use of the CDC Envi-
ronmental Checklist for Monitoring Terminal Cleaning 
[31]. We strongly believe that mechanical removal of 
biofilm may be more relevant than the type of disinfect-
ant used with regard to Acinetobacter [21]. In order to 
reinforce compliance, we decided to keep on monitor-
ing the completeness of the cycling radical environmen-
tal cleaning and disinfection by using fluorescein spray, 
not only to confirm that all surfaces were cleaned, but 
also to raise awareness and educate cleaning staff about 
terminal cleaning. This method has the advantages of 
being fast, easy to use and cost-effective, meeting the 
need for an external validation of room cleaning, which 
is mandatory in such endemic setting.
With regard to CRAB active screening strategies, an 
universal consensus has not been reached yet [10]. The 
Task force on management and prevention of Acine-
tobacter baumannii infections in the ICU has recom-
mended weekly rectal, pharyngeal and tracheal swabs 
[9]. A recently published program by Valencia-Martìn 
et  al. found a sensitivity of 96% combining rectal and 
pharyngeal swabs compared to 78% of rectal swab only 
[16]. We chose to implement active screening with 
rectal and skin swabs, but also respiratory samples 
such as endotracheal aspirates. The best performance 
was obtained by skin samples (100%), followed by the 
rectal samples (86%). As the results of CRAB screen-
ing are not immediately available, we suggest applying 
contact precautions to all ICU patients until outbreak 
termination.
Environmental sampling of A. baumannii through 
standard swabbing has proven to be sub-optimal [13], 
with sensitivity rates ranging from 0 to 18%, accord-
ing to several factors such as the extension of the out-
break and the sampling technique used. By using BHI 
pre-moistened sterile gauze pads, more than 50% of our 
environmental samples were positive for CRAB. On the 
Table 2 Change in the ICU‑CRAB ID: results from the Intervention Time Series Analysis model
R2: 0.352, Effective Number of observations: 82
Interpretation of coefficients:
Every change by one unity of an explaining series, implies a change of (the value of the coefficient) lagged by calculated lags (in month) in the dependent series 
(± t*SE)
The short-term intervention coefficient means that in the period postintervention a diminution of -7.2 (± 1.96*3.3452*0.69) new cases of nosocomial ICU CRAB/1000 
bed-days was observed
The long-term intervention coefficient means that in the period postintervention a diminution of 2.2 (± 1.96*0.63) new cases of nosocomial ICU CRAB/1000 bed-days 
was observed
Imported CRAB term means that for every new imported ICU case, 0.72 new ICU cases occurred one month later
ICU CRAB term indicates the impact of past values of the own dependent series:
- AR: Autoregressive term, reflecting impact of previous CRAB-ID (past inertia lagged by 1 month)
- MA: Moving Average term (past abrupt changes lagged by 2 and 5 months)
ICU-CRAB ID: nosocomial colonization or infection by carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii Incidence Density
Explanatory variables Lag (months) Coefficents Standard error T‑ratio p value
Constant 0 2.1900 0.2112 10.37  < 0.001
Short‑term Intervention 0 − 7.2215 3.4530 − 2.09  < 0.05
Long‑term Intervention 0 − 2.2161 0.6353 − 3.49  < 0.01
Imported CRAB 1 0.7156 0.1534 4.67  < 0.01
ICU‑CRAB (MA) 2 0.4791 0.0940 5.09  < 0.01
ICU‑CRAB (MA) 5 0.6079 0.0877 6.93  < 0.001
ICU‑CRAB (AR) 1 0.4149 0.097 4.26  < 0.01
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basis of this gain in sensitivity, the BHI pre-moistened 
method became the method of choice for CRAB envi-
ronmental detection in the whole hospital.
The CRAB isolates obtained from the environmental 
sampling represented a precious resource to investigate 
transmission in the ICU and to understand how the out-
break evolved. Indeed, sequencing data strongly suggest 
that transmission events not fully explained by patients’ 
overlapping stays could primarily result from contamina-
tion of the environment, leading to a more complicated 
transmission network. In this context, WGS played a 
fundamental role in distinguishing highly related clones 
accounting for different introduction events, and in iden-
tifying potential environmental reservoirs close to the 
patient leading to perpetuation over time. The high dis-
criminatory power provided by WGS has already been 
proven by other authors [32, 33], even if these studies 
were not able to demonstrate a link with an environmen-
tal source. Noteworthy, WGS could provide a key contri-
bution to identify specific virulence-associated genetic 
variants. Indeed, a non-functional adeN was recently 
associated with a drastic increase in the virulence poten-
tial and with a hyper invasiveness in in vivo models using 
G. mellonella and the A549 cell line, respectively (33). 
During the outbreak, only two patients who acquired a 
CRAB clone with inactivation of adeN survived, probably 
due to their younger age and less immune-compromised 
status. Such increase in virulence may have contributed 
to the high mortality rates of our outbreak, which unfor-
tunately did not differ from that reported in literature 
[34–36], despite the compassionate use of cefiderocol 
[37] in two patients.
Finally, our results should be interpreted with cau-
tion considering the main limitations: first, this is a 
single center study whose conclusions are not directly 
transferable to other facilities; second, it has been con-
ducted in a 12 bed ICU with only 3 isolation rooms and 
this could have facilitated the cross-transmission; third, 
the low use of antibiotics and the high consumption of 
AHR, as well as their lack of abrupt changes during the 
Intervention and post-intervention periods, may have 
hampered observing the logical and expected impact of 
these factors on the resistance; fourth, this analysis does 
not allow to compare the impact of antibiotics and AHR 
use vs the effect of the ICP bundle, because we were only 
able to measure the impact of the two kinds of outbreak 
interventions.
Conclusions
The application of this five-component bundle directed 
not only towards the patient (as source), but more 
importantly, aiming at eliminating environmental 
contamination, was dramatically effective in elimi-
nating nosocomial CRAB from the ICU. In addition 
to more acknowledged strategies, a novel procedure 
cycling radical cleaning and disinfection was used. 
Advanced genotyping methods, in particular WGS, 
proved to be a valuable tool for identification of the 
sustained reservoirs.
Our successful real-life experience could help inten-
sive care clinicians facing the huge challenge of CRAB 
control in ICUs with limited resources. The main 
advantages of our bundle are its low cost, applicability 
in open-space areas without cohorting, limiting admis-
sions or ICU closures.
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